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Purge and Politics in the Periphery: Birobidzhan
in 1937
Robert Weinberg

Recent scholarship on the purges and Great Terror has contributed
immensely to our understanding of the stalinist political system that
emerged in the mid-1930s. Research by J. Arch Getty and Gabor Rittersporn, among others, has challenged the totalitarian perspective
that views the Terror as part of a grand scheme designed by Stalin to

silence his opponents in the Party and government, establish his personal dictatorship and coerce society into unquestioning submission.'
Instead, these historians emphasize the limits of power and control
wielded by the national leadership which found itself at times frus-

trated in its efforts to impose its will on both society and regional party
organizations. They conclude that the "cleansing" of the Party and
government was the partial product of a conflict between national and

subnational officials, with initiative from below sometimes playing as
important a role as central directives in fueling the purges. Among the
merits of this research is that it shifts our attention from national elites

to regional functionaries, pays close attention to the daily functioning
of local politics and distinguishes among the phases of the purge phenomenon. Getty's and Rittersporn's conclusions are drawn from careful readings of the Smolensk Archives; studies of the purges in other
locales would undoubtedly shed additional light on this tragic period
in Soviet history.

Generous support for this project was provided by Swarthmoore College, the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Abroad

program and the Hoover Institution. I would like to extend a special thanks to Galina
V. Gorskaia of the Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov noveishei istorii in
Moscow and Liudmila N. Shavul'skaia of the Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Evreiskoi Avtononlnoi

Oblasti for their gracious reception and assistance. Special thanks toJ. Arch Getty and
Thompson Bradley for their assistance in translating and clarifying certain phl-ases,
and toJohn Stephan for his valuable criticism.

1. See J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and idem, "Party

and Purge in Smnolensk: 1933-1937," Slavic Review 42, no. 1 (1983): 60-79 and the
following works by Gabor Rittersporn: "Soviet Politics in the 1930s: Rehabilitating
Society," Studies in Comparative Communism 19, no. 2 (1986): 105-28; "Rethinking Stalinism," Russian History/Histoire Russe 11, no. 4 (1984): 343-61; "Societe et appareil
d'Etat sovietique (1936-1938): contradictions et interf6rences," Annales E.S.C. 34, no.

4 (1979): 843-67; "The 1930s in the Longue Duree of Soviet History," Telos, no. 53

(1982): 107-16; Simplifications staliniennes et complications sovietiques: Tensions sociales et
conflits politiques en URSS, 1933-1953 (Paris, 1988); "Staline en 1938: Apogee du verbe
et defaite politique," Libre, no. 6 (1979): 99-164; "L'Etat en lutte contre lui-rneme:

Tensions sociales et conflits politiques en URSS, 1936-1938, "Libre, no. 4 (1978):

3-38. Graeine Gill's recent The Origins of the Stalinist Political System (Camlbridge: Camibridge University Press, 1990) offers an excellent historiographical overview in his
introduction.

Slavic Review 52, no. 1 (Spring 1993)
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This study focuses on an area some five thousand miles to the east,

on Birobidzhan, the capital of the Jewish Autonomous Region (JAR)
located along the Chinese border in the Soviet far east. Materials from
recently opened party archives in Moscow and Birobidzhan throw into

relief the dynamics of the purges in the JAR and add to our understanding of a purge in the making, especially regarding how one ranking party official was swept into the maelstrom of the Great Terror.
The specific purge examined here is that of Matvei Pavlovich Khavkin,
the First Party Secretary of the JAR, who fell victim to security forces

sometime in fall 1937. Examination of the fate that befell Khavkin
clarifies the roles played by national and local pressures and personalities in generating the attack on him, and reveals the tensions and
conflicts animating political life in the JAR. Study of Khavkin's purge
demonstrates that local political developments took on a life of their
own, despite the fact that national events and policies gave birth to
and subsequently helped shape them.
Matvei Khavkin had a career that was typical of those Jewish work-

ers who joined the bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic
Workers' Party before the revolution.2 Born in 1897 in the shtetl town
of Rogachev (near Gomel) in White Russia, Khavkin became a tailor's
apprentice at age eight in order to help support his family. Influenced
by an older brother who was a revolutionary, he joined the political
underground in 1913 and the bolsheviks in 1916. For the next two

years Khavkin was in charge of bolshevik activities in his home town
and, after the bolshevik seizure of power, he moved to Gomel where
he helped establish the Soviet regime. He became involved in work for
the Cheka and in 1919 set off for the Polish front, only to be captured
by enemy forces. Khavkin managed to escape from prison in Warsaw,
however, and found his way to Brest-Litovsk where he distinguished
himself as a member of the Revolutionary Committee and military
commander. Towards the end of the civil war he helped carry out a

party purge in the town of Klintsy (not far from Minsk) and from 1922
to 1924 he served as a party secretary and member of the soviet in
Gomel province.

His superiors in the Party decided to send Khavkin to a higher
party school in 1925 as a reward for his efforts. After finishing his
course of studies, he spent the next several years overseeing the work
of the secret police in Gomel province and the Russian Republic. A
1926 report from party leaders in Gomel states that Khavkin showed
"initiative and organizational capabilities" and had "correctly imple-

mnented the party line" during his years in the region. In 1928 he was
assigned to Kazakhstan where he was chair of the Party Control Com-

2. Material on Khavkin's life is taken from a 1992 exhibit on the stalinist repressions at the Museum of the Jewish Autonomous Region in Birobidzhan. See also

Tribuna, no. 9(178) (15 September 1934):- 8-9; S. lakubson, "Sud'ba iz 'zabytoi pravdy,"'
Birobidzhanskaia zvezda (28 October 1989); Organizatsiia KPSS Evreiskoi Avtonomnoi Oblasti, 1934-1985: Khronika (Khabarovsk, 1986), 23.
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mission and responsible for a purge in 1929-1930. For his work he
was given the rank of Honorary Chekist and awarded the Order of the
Red Banner. He was then appointed first secretary of the party organization in Smolensk city, a post he held until 1934 when the Central

Committee, at the behest of Lazar' Kaganovich and Viacheslav Molo-

tov, decided to transfer himn to the newly established JAR as a member
of the Party's Organizational Committee. His appointment as first party

secretary became official at the First Party Conference of the JAR, held
in June 1935. Stalin reportedly quipped after meeting Khavkin in 1934,

"This Jew is smarter than most."3
Organized settlement of the territory that would become the JAR
had begun in 1928 when the government designated it as the national

territory of Soviet Jews.4 Given the inflated expectations of the initial
five-year plans, officials had grandiose plans for the JAR. However, a
host of social, political and economic obstacles worked against mass
settlement of the region by large numbers of Jews. By 1937 they comprised only about 20,000 of the approximately 120,000 residents of the
JAR. As party chief, Khavkin was responsible for overseeing the overall
development of the JAR but, like many counterparts throughout the

Soviet Union, he had little success in mobilizing the forces of the Party,

government and society to mneet the targets set by government planners
in industry, agriculture, housing and culture.

Khavkin's 1937 elimination as party chief in the JAR should be
seen in the larger context of the series of internal purges that the Party
had conducted within its ranks after the 1933-1934 expulsion of 22

percent of the party's national membership.5 That purge found party
members "undesirable" because they undermined and violated party
policy, lacked the requisite moral rectitude, or were politically passive,
class-aliens or guilty of careerism. Local purge officials were cautioned

not to subject rank-and-file members to interrogations of sophisticated
questions about the party program and history; they were instructed
to reduce to candidate status but not to expel members who lacked

sufficient levels of political and ideological education.6 The responses
from party m-iembers in the JAR in fall 1933 reveal that many comn3. Quote taken fi-om the exhibit on the purges at the Museum of the Jewish
Autonomous Region.

4. See Solomon Schwarz, ThleJews in the Soviet Union (Syracuse: Syracuse Univer-sity
Press, 1951) and idem, "Birobidzhan: An Experimient in Jewish Colonization" in Russian Jezvry, 1917-1967, eds. Gregor Aronson, Jacob Frumnkin, Alexis Goldenweiser, et

al. (London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1969), 342-95; Nora Levin, The Jews ifn the Soviet Union
since 1917: Paradox of Survival (New York: New York University Press, 1988), vol. 1,

chap. 13; Henri Sloves, LEtatJuif de l'Union Sovietique (Paris, 1982); and Chimi-ein Abi-amisky, "The Biro-Bidzhain Project, 1927-1959," in TheJews in Soviet Russia since 1917, 3rd
ed., ed. Lionel Kochan (New York: Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1978), 64-77, for useful
overviews of the JAR from its inception to the end of the 1930s. The most compr-ehensive accounit is provided in Hebrew by Jacob Lvavi,Jezvish Colonization in Birobidzhan
(Jerusalem, 1965).

5. Getty, "Party and Purge in Smolensk, 1933-1937," 69.
6. Getty, The Origins of the Great Purges, 48-57.
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munists were not only utterly ignorant of the intricacies of party ide-

ology but even of major current events. For example, more than a
handful did not know who Stalin was! Several responded to the ques-

tion, "Who is Comrade Stalin?" with the disingenuous but honest, "A
person." On the whole, members who were deemed "politically ignorant" were reduced to candidate status; such candidates for party mem-

bership lost that status. However, members were expelled who were
found guilty of poor party work, such as failure to implement party

directives and rudeness to subordinates, or of concealing a checkered
political past (e.g. fighting for the whites or not admitting former mem-

bership in the Bund or a Zionist organization).7
The next efforts of the national political leadership to rid the Party
of members considered undeserving of party cards occurred in con-

junction with the "verification and exchange of party documents campaign" in 1935 and 1936. Not only were the personal and work lives
of communists once again subject to party scrutiny, but political reliability in the sense of holding (or once holding) trotskyite or zinovievite views intruded into the purge process. Thus, party activists were

expelled for shoddy record keeping, not maintaining complete and

accurate membership lists, as well as for drunkenness, "moral depravity" and shirking of party responsibilities. Some rank-and-file members
were disciplined for not being able to read and write, others for having
lost their party cards, while others were accused of insufficient party
vigilance, trotskyism, ties with foreign elements, and white guardism.

According to party documents, some 217 party members in the JAR
were expelled by spring 1937 as a result of this camipaign; and a recent
article by a member of the Party Control Commission in theJAR states

that some 400 full and candidate members were purged from the mnidto late 1930s.8
Khavkin's troubles began after the February-March 1937 plenum
of the Central Committee at which, among other things, Stalin and

Andrei Zhdanov called for self-criticism at party meetings and raised
the specter that party leaders themselves could be suspect. As Getty
points out, rank-and-file members in the Smolensk region responded

to the national leadership's message to be more vigilant by, in the

words of a Pravda editorial, engaging in "severe" and "pitiless" criti-

cism of local leaders.') In theJAR Khavkin found himself the target of

7. See Partiinyi arkhiv obkoma KPSS Evreiskoi Avtonomnnoi Oblasti, f. 6, op. 1, d. 43.
Hereafter cited as PAOEAO.

8. F. Sachuk, "Vozvrashchennaia chest'," Birobildzhanskaia zvezdai (4 Marl-ch 1990):
2 and PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 16, 127-31 and 143-45, and d. 21, 33-34. See also the
papers of the Otdel rukovodiashchikh partiinykh organov of the Centr-al Commiittee of the

Commniiiiiiist Party of the Soviet Union- at the Rossiiskii tsenitr khraneniiia i izuchenilia
dokutmenitov noveishei istorii in Moscow, especially f. 17, op. 21, d. 5403, 9-19, d. 5432,
174 and 182-182 ob., d. 5547, 60-61, 95-110 and 179, d. 5549, 93-97, 157 and 161,

and d. 5550, 52-56, 60, 75-76, 95-97, 101, and 131-32. Hereafter- citecl as CC-ORPO.
9. Getty, The Origins of the Great Pto.ges, 149-50.
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a vociferous campaign waged by local party members to strip him not
only of his post as first party secretary but of his party card as well.

At one of a series of meetings, held from 29 March to 1 April by
Birobidzhan party activists, Khavkin revealed that he had concealed
from the Party that he had been a member of the trotskyite opposition
in 1923. His admission came in the midst of accusations by party mem-

bers (who apparently took the speeches and resolutions of the Febru-

ary-March plenum to heart) that he had stifled inner party democracy
and suppressed criticism of his failings as an administrator. In partic-

ular, Khavkin was held responsible for underfulfillment of the plan on
housing and settlement of migrants. He was also charged with being
"arrogant" and "conceited," promoting obsequiousness and encouraging pomp and circumstance designed to glorify him as leader of the
JAR. One indicator of Khavkin's control over party members is re-

vealed in the telling statement of one candidate member to the obkom

(oblastnyi komitet, the leading party institution in the JAR): "If I am not
correct, then only the first secretary of the obkom can correct me." Or,
as Khavkin reportedly responded to a group of critics at an early April
meeting of party activists, "Don't forget that I still have the final

word." ")
The heated exchanges at these meetings stirred up party members
in the JAR, whose behavior may also have been energized by news of

a meeting between Khavkin and Georgii Malenkov who, as head of the
Central Committee's Department of Leading Party Organs (Otdel ru-

kovodiashchikh partiinykh organov) supervised the purges and had summoned the JAR's first secretary to Moscow in March. Alexander Suturin, a journalist who has devoted his recent endeavors to the study of

the purges in the Soviet far east, suggests that Malenkov told Khavkin
he was disappointed with the results of the "verification and exchange

of party documents" campaign in theJAR.' Khavkin's admission of a
trotskyite past may have been a response to this barely disguised threat

and an attempt to save his political career, if not his life. Reports of
the meeting may have prompted speculation among local JAR activists
that Khavkin was already in hot water and therefore a legitimate target
for attack.

When the obkom held a plenum several days later on 6 April, it
decided to "dismiss" (sniat') Khavkin as party secretary and instructed
the primary party organization to review his membership. However,
the kraikom (kraevoi komitet, leading party organization of the Far East-

ern Territory, headquartered in Khabarovsk and immediately superior
to the obkom of theJAR) informed the plenum that its action violated

10. Tribuna, no. 8(229) (30 April 1937): 5 and 7; Tikhookeanskaia zvezda (8 April
1937 and 9 May 1937).

11. It is unclear upon what evidence Sutuiin bases his conclusion regarding the
conversation between Khavkin and Malenkov. A. Suturin, Delo kraevogo iasshtaba (Khabarovsk, 1991), 122 and idemn, "Bez viny vinovatye," Birobidzhanskaia zvezda (12 May
1989).
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party rules since it could not dismiss Khavkin without the preliminary

approval of the kraikom. The obkom was annoyed with the kraikom's
position but nonetheless agreed to reformulate its resolution to read,
"It is impossible for Khavkin to remain at work as first secretary"; it
then requested the kraikom to resolve the issue of the "immediate dis-

missal" (nemedlennoe sniatie) of Khavkin as first secretary.'2
The plenum found Khavkin guilty of encouraging "toadyism, pomposity, political arrogance and intrigue" and urging communists to

"attack each other." Moreover, "a widely developed sense of family
loyalty and cliquishness (semeistvennost') has led to an absence of col-

legiality in the obkom, the burying of inner party democracy, the isolation of the obkom from the party masses and the loss in taste for party
work." Khavkin surrounded himself "with his own people" whom he
had brought from Smolensk and "who zealously groveled to create a
stifling atmosphere in which comrades brave enough to criticize Khavkin were persecuted." This state of affairs, according to the plenum,

contributed to a lack of party vigilance that was responsible for the
dismal record of the Party to meet the goals of increased settlement

and economic development.'3
Criticism of Khavkin intensified in April and May, with grievances
against him appearing in both a prominent regional newspaper and
national journal. Tikhookeanskaia zvezda, the major party daily of the
Far Eastern Territory published in Khabarovsk, paid careful attention

to developments in neighboring Birobidzhan and kept its readers
abreast of the accusations lodged against Khavkin at various meetings

held by the Party in theJAR. By its publication of articles condemning
Khavkin's style of leadership and political errors, the paper played a
crucial role in mobilizing opinion against Khavkin. For example, the

11 April issue reported that Khavkin had plotted against Semen Kremer, the secretary of the Komsomol in the JAR, because Kremer had
learned about Khavkin's "trotskyite past." According to this account,
when Kremer denounced Khavkin to party superiors in Moscow and
Khabarovsk, the JAR leader instructed his cronies in the obkom to manufacture evidence damning Kremer as "an accomplice of the trotskyites"; Kremer was expelled from the Party as a result of these machinations. Tikhookeanskaia zvezda also reported that the Russian- and
Yiddish-language dailies in the JAR worked closely with Khavkin to
conceal the mistakes of his leadership and suppressed all criticism of
the obkom. l4
National airing of the accusations against Khavkin took place on
the pages of Tribuna, the journal published by the Society for the Agricultural Settlement of Jewish Toilers in the Soviet Union (Obshchestvo

12. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5552, 60; PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 22, 17.
13. PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 23, 3-5.

14. Tikhookeanskaia zvezda (11 April 1937, 26 April 1937 and 9 May 1937). See also
PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1. d. 22, 9-13 for additional material on Ki-emer's struggle with
Khavkin.
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po zemelt'nomu ustroistvu trudiashchikhsia v SSSR). Tribuna began publishing articles critical of Khavkin at the end of April. Like Tikhookeanskaia
zvezda, it reported the denunciations of Khavkin and contended that

his "trotskyite proclivitie's" were responsible for the dismal state of
affairs in the JAR. Thus, it was no surprise that enemies of the people
had escaped detection as long as they did. Tribuna repeated the com-

plaint of a supplier of essential consumer items, Kogan, who was kept
busy attending to Khavkin's demands for frequent banquets and dinners despite severe shortages of kerosene, salt and matches. Tribuna
also published details about Khavkin's "trotskyite activities" in 1923:
not only did he belong to "an anti-party group" but he delivered "trotskyite speeches" and even was sent from Moscow to Gomel to conduct
"trotskyite agitation." Interestingly, Tribuna frequently couched its attack on Khavkin in language designed to resonate among its primarily

Jewish readership. For example, his control of the obkom was likened
to the authoritarian control of the elders in the kahal, the traditional
Jewish community council; in another article critical of certain aspects
of cultural work in the JAR, Khavkin's leadership style was likened to

that of an "insulted shtetl synagogue elder." 15
Members of the Party at the highest levels in Moscow had evidently

been closely following developments in theJAR and were in possession

of materials forwarded by the kraikom after the 6 April obkom plenum.
On 10 May the Politburo resolved to accept the suggestion of the Far
Eastern kraikom to "relieve" (osvobodit') Khavkin of his position as first
secretary of the JAR. The Politburo also "brought Khavkin under the

jurisdiction" or "put Khavkin at the disposal" (otozval ego v raspor-

iazhenie) of the Central Committee.'6 It is crucial to note the difference
between the demand of the obkom to dismiss (sniat') Khavkin from his
responsibilities and review his party membership and the Politburo's
decision to relieve or release (osvobodit'), which was a less severe punishment. Party personnel were periodically relieved of their posts while
they were reassigned, with no stigma attached to the action. But to be
relieved of one's post and at the same time put at the disposal of the
Central Committee indicated that it was not clear whether one was

going to be reassigned or left languishing while one's future was de-

cided by party superiors. In practice, the Politburo essentially responded that no decision had been taken regarding Khavkin and left
open the possibility that he might be given another assignment. During

the first half of 1937 to be relieved and put at the disposal of the
Central Committee was a much more lenient punishment than to be
dismissed, which usually entailed that one's career was finished and

that one was likely to be arrested. In addition, the Politburo's assertion
of its authority over the dispensation of Khavkin ("place him under

the jurisdiction of the Central Committee") suggests that it felt that

15. Tribuna, no. 8(229) (30 April 1937): 4-8 and no. 11(232) (15June 1937): 3-5.
16. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 3, Protokoly Politbiuro, ed. khr. 987, 44.
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his local opponents might ignore its decision and continue to stalk
him. Clearly the Politburo had not yet determined Khavkin's fate; indeed, one could conclude that it was trying to shield him.

The decision of the Politburo quickly reached party officials in
Khabarovsk who approved the resolution at a meeting four days later.
However, the punishment meted out to Khavkin did not placate those
party activists who were critical of him. They continued their attack

and even turned their attention to Josif Vareikis who, as head of the
Party in the Far Eastern Territory, was held personally responsible for

the kraikom's "toothless" and "liberal" decisions. Several in attendance
at the meeting expressed their annoyance that the "strict reprimand"

(strogii vygovor) given to Khavkin was not recorded in his personnel file.
P. G. Moskatov, representative of the Party Control Commission in the
Far Eastern Territory, whose responsibilities included supervising the
purges, expressed his displeasure with the kraikom's failure to adopt
stricter measures against Khavkin. Yet, despite charges of embezzlement and other crimes, on 20 May the kraikom approved Khavkin's

request for an all-expense paid vacation at a resort.17 The fact that
Vareikis and the kraikom were following a Politburo directive and therefore were without choice did not deter their critics who continued to

clamor for Khavkin's purge at the Second Party Conference of theJAR

(21-26 May) and the Twelfth Party Conference of the Far Eastern Territory, held in late May and earlyJune.
At the Second Party Conference delegates from throughout theJAR

elaborated on the accusations that had already been lodged against
Khavkin since early April. For example, speakers noted that Josif Liberberg, who had been purged as head of government in the JAR in
August 1936, and Khavkin each knew that the other was a trotskyite

and that they competed with each other for political supremacy in the
JAR. Khavkin was condemned for "major political mistakes . . . and
anti-state activities, and for the systematic perversion of party decisions

and principles of bolshevik leadership." All the deficiencies and shortcomings of life in theJAR were attributed to Khavkin, whose trotskyite
proclivities helped the enemies of the Soviet Union. Khavkin routinely
forced people to sign false denunciations of those whom he considered

a threat to his power and authority. Moreover, his "1923 mistake was
not an accident," as Fedor Stasiukov, head of the Department of Leading Organs in the JAR, asserted. Finally, Khavkin supposedly had kept
his trotskyite literature with a relative in Moscow for safekeeping until

fall 1936.18 The conference concluded that Khavkin must be expelled
from the Party and brought up on criminal charges. One conference

resolution stated that the "kraikom is not heeding the voice of our

17. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5439, 7-9 and 121; Tikhookea'nskaia zvezda (2 June
1937); Suturin, Delo kraevogo masshtaba, 122-24 and idem, "Bez viny vinovatye," Birobidzhanskaia zvezda (19 May 1989).
18. PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 21 and d. 22 for the stenographic account of the

conference. The quotes are from d. 21, 28 and d. 22, 21, respectively.
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organization. . . . The kraikom must review its decision and appeal to
the Central Committee. It must expel Khavkin from the Party and turn

him over for trial."'9 Chief Inspector of the Party Control Commission
in the Far Eastern Territory, Beliaev, lent his weight to the attack on
Khavkin and the kraikom when he noted that, as of early April, "it was
clear to every party member that Khavkin could not remain as party
secretary one more day." He insisted that it was also "clear to the party
masses but not to the kraikom, which did not bother to send anyone to

check on the charges against Khavkin," that, as a trotskyite, he should
be expelled and prosecuted. Beliaev also criticized Vareikis for ordering in April a halt to attacks on Khavkin; the obvious implication was
that the party chief of the Far Eastern Territory was protecting a trotskyite. In an effort to apply pressure on higher party authorities and
embarrass Vareikis, he concluded:
Khavkin is a nomenklatura worker of the Central Committee, but if the

kraikom were aware of the real situation in theJAR and the full picture
of Khavkin's crimes, then it would have already had the sanction of
the Central Committee to expel Khavkin from the Party and bring
him to criminal responsibility. This is what the district party groups
want. If only the kraikom would listen to the party masses as the Central Committee and Comrade Stalin demand. It is only unclear to the
kraikom that Khavkin cannot be in the Party. Khavkin remains as party

secretary . . . and all this has disoriented the obkom and caused confusion. I am sure that the kraikom will reconsider its decision and do
what it must ....

Beliaev then declared, "Personally I will not rest until Khavkin is ex-

pelled from the Party."20
The Far Eastern Territory Party Conference held immediately after
the JAR's conference did not resolve the issue of Khavkin but only

provided another venue for attacks on him and the kraikom.21 However,
it also offered Vareikis the opportunity to rebut those who had been
challenging his political judgment. In his closing remarks to the conference, he reasoned that if Khavkin employed "trotskyite methods"
in his work, then he had to belong to a trotskyite organization and
engage in espionage and sabotage because "trotskyites are conspirators, spies and saboteurs who now use only these methods." Vareikis
conceded that Khavkin was guilty of concealing his past from the Party
until 1937, but he also argued that Khavkin was not a trotskyite since

not one of his accusers had offered evidence of his being a spy. 22
Vareikis's speech succeeded in shifting the attention away from Khavkin by playing upon the spy hysteria that had already been whipped

19. PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 21, 20.

20. PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 22, 17-18. See also CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, ed. khr.
5381, 217-21 and ed. khr. 5385, 182-83.

21. For the stenogr-aphic account of the confer-enlce, see CC-ORPO, f. 17, o01. 21,
ed. khr. 5381-5386.

22. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, ed. khr. 5382, 200.
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up by a recent article in Pravda warning about espionage in the Soviet

far east.23
Despite all the fireworks at the various party meetings in the JAR
and Far Eastern Territory from April to earlyJune, the critics of Khavkin did not succeed in stripping him of his party card. The campaign

against him ceased for the duration of summer and into fall 1937 when
his political fate was finally determined. Available sources do not allow

us to determine with precision when he was arrested by the security
police but existing evidence indicates that he probably fell into the
clutches of the NKVD in the aftermath of the arrest of Vareikis, who
was seized in early October in connection with the purge of the Red

Army.24 Revived attacks on Khavkin and his "protector" Vareikis began
to appear on the pages of Tikhookeanskaia zvezda in mid-October, which
suggests that the party leadership may have finally decided what to do

with him. On 11-12 October a plenum of the obkom of theJAR resolved
that it "considers it utterly impermissible that a clear enemy of the
people, former secretary of the obkom Khavkin, remains free" and still
retains his party card. According to a speech at the Third Party Con-

ference of the JAR in 1938, the NKVD had uncovered evidence of a
"counterrevolutionary organization under Khavkin" in September/Oc-

tober 1937. The obkom requested the kraikom to turn over all material
about the "enemy activities of Khavkin" to the Central Committee
which should expel him from the Party and bring him up on criminal

charges. It was not until late December 1937 that party organizations
in the JAR expelled Khavkin from the Party as an enemy of the people,

but by then he was already behind bars.25
Khavkin languished in prison until January 1941 when, after three
military tribunals, he was given a sentence of fifteen years under article

58.7 of the criminal code for undermining the economy for counter
revolutionary purposes. By this time a series of interrogators had subjected him to countless beatings which resulted in a loss of several

teeth and an injury to his spine. He was sent to a labor camp where
his childhood apprenticeship as a tailor made him indispensable to

the prison guards who depended on him to sew tunics for them. This
skill, along with his ability to organize clothing production for the
camp, enabled him to survive the rigors of camp life until the early
1950s when he was released from the gulag. He was then exiled to
Kazakhstan where he again helped organize a clothing workshop, a

service for which he received in 1955 a certificate (pochetnaia gramota)
honoring his contribution to local industry. In early 1956 Khavkin's
sentence was overturned and he was permitted to return to Moscow

where he was given an apartmnent and invited to rejoin the Party. In

23. I thank John Stephan for the information about the article in Pravda.
24. D. D. Lappo, "Stoikii leninets (Stranitsy zhizni i deiatel'nosti I. M Vareikisa),"

Volprosy istorii KPSS, no. 11 (1963): 100-5.
25. Tikhookeanskaia zvezda (16 October 1937 and 17 October 1937); PAOEAO, f.
1, op. 1, d. 23, 19 and d. 37, 12-13; Suturin, Delo kraevogo masshtaba, 125.
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an ultimate display of irony, Khavkin was awarded the Order of Lenin
in 1967. He died sometime in the 1980s.26
What does this brief account of Khavkin's travails reveal about the
purge process in general? First, it points out the difficulty in determining the relative weights to be assigned to central party authorities
and local party activists when considering attacks on a particular person. On the one hand, the fact that the Central Committee and Polit-

buro apparently had no firm and set plan in April and May 1937
regarding the fate of Khavkin does not necessarily mean that he was
removed from his post as first party secretary only as a result of local

pressure. The possibility exists that the inner sanctum of the Party was
planning to move against Khavkin as early as March but did so only

incrementally, in fits and starts. Before summer 1937, when arrests and
executions reached their crescendo, it was not unusual for individuals
targeted by Moscow to be stripped of their posts and remain free while
a case was manufactured against them. Indeed, some regional party
secretaries remained in their posts despite denunciation by Stalin and

other Politburo members.27 Such a policy could explain why Khavkin
remained at liberty even though his political star had begun to fall: his
relatively lenient punishment may not have been the result of the center lagging behind the periphery but the consequence of Moscow plotting in a calculated manner each successive move against a regional
party leader.
There are several problems with this interpretation, however, not
the least of which are the lack of substantiation and the preponderance
of evidence which leads to another conclusion. The failure to arrest

and execute Khavkin and others at the first sign of suspicion may have
reflected indecision and even a lack of agreement among party leaders
regarding the purges themselves. While leaders in Moscow may have
initiated and encouraged the witch-hunts to ferret out class enemies,

the existing materials on the JAR strongly indicate that the center
lagged behind the periphery in calling for his purge. Even though it

is difficult to ascertain what those Central Comnmittee members responsible for overseeing the purge of nomenklatura officials were doing

behind the scenes, their action regarding Khavkin suggests that the

party leadership was taken by surprise by his confession and had no
detailed list of individuals to be purged. Pressure from below targeted

individuals for denunciation, particularly after the February-March
1937 plenum unleashed rank-and-file members and actively solicited
their criticism of superiors. Khavkin's survival is a clear sign that
confessions of one's past "political crimes" did not automatically trans-

late into signing one's death warrant, at least in spring 1937.
Getty and Rittersporn conclude that the center responded to cues
and pressures from the periphery as much as it tried to control events
26. lakubson; Exhibit at the Museum of the Jewish Autonomous Region.
97. See Rittersporn, "Soviet Politics in the 1930s," 118; Getty, The Origins of the
Great PArges, 178.
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in the far-flung reaches of the Soviet Union. What we know about the
reaction of Khavkin's enemies at the various party meetings and conferences in May and June buttresses their conclusions that the denunciation of superiors from below was more than a facade designed

to provide the appearance of rank-and-file power and influence.28 To
be sure, Khavkin's political fate ultimately depended on the decision
of the purge commissions, security forces and Politburo, but the vociferous condemnation of Khavkin and Vareikis by those displeased
with the Politburo decision underscores the fact that many rank-andfile party members took seriously the injunction of the February-March
plenum to unmask and depose party officials (including those appointed by the center) through denunciation and criticism. Despite the

fact that the hands of Vareikis and the kraikom were tied by the decision
of the Politburo, Khavkin's detractors, including representatives of the
Central Committee's Party Control Commission and Department of
Leading Party Organs, remained undaunted in their thirst for the
purge. Surely they knew that someone in Khavkin's position could be
removed only by a decision emanating from the very top of the Party;
nonetheless, they continued their campaign in the hope that higher
party organizations would accede to pressure.
Another conclusion to be drawn from this examination of Khavkin
is that the purges depended in no small measure on the successful

mobilization of the rank and file against entrenched local party machines. Michael Gelb argues that the verification campaign "reflected

the populist face of Stalinism" by "eliciting mass participation in political life."29 A major argument found in recent research is that the
national elites depended on the rank-and-file membership in their cam-

paign to assert central control over obdurate regional officials who
refused to implement directives of the Central Committee and who

had set themselves up as mini-potentates ruling with the help of local
cliques or "families" of dedicated assistants.30 In the case of the JAR,
Khavkin's close circle of associates (termed an "artel"' by his detrac-

tors), whom he had brought with him from Smolensk, also fell victim

to the security forces by the end of 1937: of the 51 members of the
JAR's obkom in mid-1937, only six retained their membership one year
later.31

28. In his recent book Stalin in Power, Robert Tucker, who is hardly sympathetic
to the views of Getty and Rittersporn, agrees that the February-March plenum was
designed to stir LIp the rank-and-file membership against its immediate superiors.

However, he views the plenum as a cynical maneuver by Stalin, with little or no
connection to the struggle between the national and regional leaderships that animates
the approaches of Getty and Rittersporn. See Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution
from Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), chap. 17, especially 459 and
464-65.

29. Michael Gelb, "Mass Politics Under Stalinism: Two Case Studies." John Strong,
ed., Essays on Revolutionary Culture and Stalinism (Columbus: Slavica, 1990), 188-89.
30. See the sources listed in note 1.

31. PAOEAO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 21, 4-5 and d. 37, 3.
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But the fact that many of Khavkin's second lieutenants remained

at their posts even after their boss was stripped of his position and
were arrested only when Khavkin himself was is evidence that the JAR

was not yet targeted in spring 1937. The pronouncements and policies
of the national leadership certainly provided the opportunity for the
grassroots campaign against Khavkin but the available sources do not
support the conclusions that a "hit" list existed and the purge of the
Party in the JAR was predetermined. The failure in the spring of Mal-

enkov's envoys to have Khavkin arrested is strong proof that the Central Committee had not yet determined his fate, notwithstanding the
protestations of officials such as Moskatov and Beliaev who were su-

pervising the purges in the JAR at the behest of the center. There is
no doubt that these representatives of the Central Committee were
targeting Khavkin but neither they nor Malenkov at that time evidently
had the upper hand in determining the fate of theJAR's first secretary.
Despite the evidence mounting against Khavkin in April and May,

which was collected by emissaries of the Central Committee itself, the
Politburo nonetheless chose to deal with Khavkin in a lenient manner,
suggesting splits within the party leadership regarding the organization, implementation and targets of the purges in the first half of 1937.
The Khavkin affair served purposes other than rooting out suspected class enemies and unseating ensconced political cliques. Despite the personal tragedies that befell many party members in the
aftermath of the February-March plenum, the campaign did have a

beneficial effect. Not only did it allow disgruntled activists, particularly
those with opportunistic bents and scores to settle, to vent steam and
accuse their superiors of poor work and leadership, but it also provided a sense of empowerment to party members who were given the
opportunity at the party conferences in May and June to engage in

scathing criticism of Khavkin and his "artel'." All sorts of resentments,
frustrations and complaints came to the fore when party activists, either

seeking to advance their careers or merely acting out of a desire for
self-preservation as the maelstrom of the purges swirled all around
them in the Soviet far east, were encouraged to criticize their superiors.
The stenographic reports of the Second Party Conference of the JAR

and the Twelfth Party Conference of the Far Eastern Territory contain
dozens of speeches by managers of factories, collective farms, schools,
construction sites and the like who placed responsibility for all the

shortcomings and failings of socialist construction in the JAR on the
doorstep of Khavkin. It is little wonder that everybody connected with

the Party's effort to manage all aspects of social, cultural and economic
life in the JAR sought to lessen their own responsibility for abysmal
conditions by shifting blame to a confessed trotskyite. This sense of
being able to influence local affairs while escaping personal responsibility was translated into greater rank-and-file support for Stalin and
the central leadership, who benefited from the willingness of party
members to blame an individual local leader rather than the stalinist

system itself. The campaign of criticism and denunciation also served
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the national leadership's interests by shifting the spotlight from its
failed policies to supposed "enemies of the people" who were seeking
to destroy the Soviet Union from within. It kept all party members
guessing as to who, as a result of association with Khavkin or one of

his associates, might be the next victim.
What role did the peculiarlyJewish nature of the JAR play in the
purge process? That is, did it matter that Khavkin and others were
Jewish? Examination of party materials in archives in Birobidzhan and
Moscow indicates that, for the most part, in the JAR one's ethnicity
had little or no impact on whether one fell victim to the Great Terror.
If the purge was designed to eliminateJews from the ranks of the Party
in the JAR, then we might expect fewer Jews at subsequent party conferences; however, the percentage of Jews attending party conferences
in the JAR remained constant at about thirty percent between 1935

and 1938.32 Khavkin and his associates were targeted not because they
wereJewish but because they were politically suspect. Nonetheless, past

involvement inJewish political causes, such as membership in the Bund
or a Zionist organization before or just after the revolution, was sometimes used against party members in th-e mid-1930s, who found themselves accused of "counter revolutionary trotskyite, bourgeois nation-

alist activities." This was particularly if they concealed this information

from the purge commissions.33
Purge victims also found that association with Josif Liberberg,
whose involvement withJewish concerns was a significant factor in his
downfall as head of the JAR's government, could be used against them.
In 1928 Liberberg helped found the Jewish Cultural Institute in Kiev

and then moved to the JAR when it was formally established in 1934.
He was later accused of trotskyism and bourgeois nationalism for attempting to establish the JAR as the center of Jewish culture in the
Soviet Union. He was also accused of replacing Russian workers in one
factory withJews because he allegedly believed thatJews should occupy
important positions in the JAR.34 One party member who worked
closely with Liberberg was purged because in 1934 he had advocated
the russification of Yiddish, hardly a sign of blind commitment to
Jewish causes. As the purge commission concluded, "This harmful po-

sition was the result of a lack of faith in the development of the Yiddish
language and Yiddish culture in a proletarian dictatorship."35 And in
Khavkin's case, the party chief's working relationship with Liberberg
was twisted into evidence of his political unreliability and failure to
weed out trotskyites.

32. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5538, 14-15 and d. 5539, 16; PAOEAO, f. I, op. 1,
d. 21, 24.

33. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5547, 95, and d. 5552, 38.
34. Tribuna, no. 9 (230) (15 May 1937): 3-7; CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5550, 58;
Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Evreiskoi Avtonomtinoi Oblasti, f. 75, op. 1, d. 63, 1; PAOEAO, f. 1,

op. 1, d. 11, 58, d. 15, 15, and d. 21, 75; Benjamin Pinkus, TheJews of the Soviet Union:
The History of a National Minority (Cambridge: Cambriclge University Press, 1988), 125.

35. CC-ORPO, f. 17, op. 21, d. 5551, 97-98.
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Finally, to end on a tragi-comic note, perhaps the most glaring

example of someone falling victim because of his or her Jewishness
was Khavkin's wife, Sofia Pavlovich, who was accused of trying to poison Lazar' Kaganovich with homemade gefilte fish when he came for
dinner in 1936 while inspecting the JAR. She was arrested along with

Khavkin, sentenced to a labor camp and eventually ended up in a

mental hospital.36
In conclusion, lack of detailed information about the decision-making process in the Politburo, especially in the case of the Great Terror,

makes it difficult to know what, if anything, the party leadership in the
Kremlin was planning to do with Khavkin. Stalin and his closest associates encouraged a generalized rank-and-file attack on local party
leaders and it was no coincidence that party activists in the JAR began
criticizing Khavkin in the wake of the February-March plenum. There-

fore culpability for the purges belongs to the Kremlin. But contrary to
the conclusions of investigators like Alexander Suturin, who stresses
that initiative, direction and guidance from Moscow explain the tar-

geting of Khavkin and other purge victims, the available materials

concerning the purges in the JAR suggest that Moscow was not yet
focused on Khavkin in spring 1937.37 Ultimate responsibility for what
happened in the JAR and throughout the Soviet Union during the
Great Terror resides in the Politburo and especially with Stalin, but
understanding the course of specific purges requires that we take into

account local events and personalities. More specifically, careful attention must be paid to the interaction between the center and the periphery and how news and information about events in theJAR influenced decision making in Moscow. Thus, local circumstances helped

determine Khavkin's fate as did the machinations of party leaders behind the walls of the Kremlin.

36. Exhibit at the Museum of the JAR.

37. Suturin writes that "the first steps in beginning to unmask enemies" in the
JAR did not occur as a result of "initiative from below, but from massive pressure
from above." See "Bez viny vinovatye," Birobidzhanskaia zvezda (12 May, 1989).
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